Robert Goodin on the Epistemic Boundaries of Condorcet's Jury Theorum

WPES February 19, 2010

Introduction

Bob Goodin is one of the leading lights of contemporary political theory, so it was a special treat for the Washington University Political Theory Workshop to welcome him to present his paper, "Epistemic Aspects of Representative Government."  

Goodin's paper - which traces the boundaries of Condorcet's Jury Theorum as it engages with the Federalist hypothesis on the effects of representative selection and deliberation - is a bit atypical for the workshop in that a number of its conclusions are either supported by or directly follow from mathematics.  Goodin chuckled that he left that work for his paper's coauthor, Kai Spiekermann.  As Goodin described the division of labor, "If you ask me hard mathematical questions, I'll take a note, and Kai will get back to you."

Paper Summary

The reason behind the paper's use of mathematics is that, while the Jury Theorum is interesting analytically, its real substance comes when applied to numbers that actually correspond to the modern world.  Math allows Goodin to ask such fascinating and relevant questions as, "how much more competent do American legislators have to be than their much more numerous voters in order for them to be more likely to make a correct decision?"  Goodin argues that the disparity is so great that legislator superiority on the basis of selection effects flirts with impossibility.  

There remain, however, deliberation effects, since the smaller, more coordinated group might be in a better position to uncover evidence, generate new choice possibilities, or engage in what Goodin terms "premise probing."

Respondent

Andrew Rehfeld was the respondent to Goodin's paper.  [To read his full comments, click here.]  After a comprehensive summary of the paper, Rehfeld commented that he admired the precision developed in Goodin's paper but remained skeptical of its real world relevance: "even if all [of the paper's analysis] is right, it leaves too much out of the epistemic picture."  As examples, Rehfeld cited the problems of partisanship and opinion leaders, which seem inadequately considered in the Condorcet model. 

Rehfeld also suggested that Goodin's argument would be strengthened by broadening the paper's account of the Federalist conjecture.  In addition to selection and deliberative effects, James Madison argued that constituency size was a key factor in ensuring that voters could not effectively communicate with their representatives. Knowing, that they cannot get their representatives enact their selfish wishes, voters would be more likely to choose the representative who would be the best "deliberator and decider for the public good."  Thus, Madison argues that voters would be better at selecting representatives than voting on laws simply because it is the former vote where they chose not on the basis of "what is best for me?" but rather "what is best for all?"  

Group Discussion

Clarissa Hayward of WUSTL Political Theory raised the possibility that in addition to making "correct" decisions, making consistent decisions is also important.  By this logic, representatives may benefit from specialization in that they are in the best position to make decisions that best fit as part of a coherent strategy in a way that voters do not.  Goodin responded that the Condorcet Jury Theorum's definition of correctness would seem to preempt this logic and that he thought that voters were at least as likely to be consistent as representatives.

Ian MacMullen pointed out that even though Goodin's paper finds reason to support representative deliberation, the logic does not imply that representatives should make the final decision.  Rather, the CJT means that representatives should merely make the results of their deliberation public (such as a narrowing the number of alternatives) and then let the masses make the final decision.  Goodin agreed and said he would likely state MacMullen's point explicitly in his next draft.

Conclusion
WPES has been trying to bring in Robert Goodin since its inception, and his presentation certainly met our high expectations.  Goodin's paper was an impressive synthesis of contemporary and traditional political theory, and his presentation made for a very fruitful workshop.  


-Greg Allen