Robert Goodin on the Epistemic Boundaries of Condorcet's Jury Theorum

WPES February 19, 2010

Introduction

Bob Goodin is one of the leading lights of contemporary political theory, so it was a special treat for the Washington University Political Theory Workshop to welcome him to present his paper, "Epistemic Aspects of Representative Government."  

Goodin's paper - which traces the boundaries of Condorcet's Jury Theorum as it engages with the Federalist hypothesis on the effects of representative selection and deliberation - is a bit atypical for the workshop in that a number of its conclusions are either supported by or directly follow from mathematics.  Goodin chuckled that he left that work for his paper's coauthor, Kai Spiekermann.  As Goodin described the division of labor, "If you ask me hard mathematical questions, I'll take a note, and Kai will get back to you."

Paper Summary

The reason behind the paper's use of mathematics is that, while the Jury Theorum is interesting analytically, its real substance comes when applied to numbers that actually correspond to the modern world.  Math allows Goodin to ask such fascinating and relevant questions as, "how much more competent do American legislators have to be than their much more numerous voters in order for them to be more likely to make a correct decision?"  Goodin argues that the disparity is so great that legislator superiority on the basis of selection effects flirts with impossibility.  

There remain, however, deliberation effects, since the smaller, more coordinated group might be in a better position to uncover evidence, generate new choice possibilities, or engage in what Goodin terms "premise probing."

Respondent

Andrew Rehfeld was the respondent to Goodin's paper.  [To read his full comments, click here.]  After a comprehensive summary of the paper, Rehfeld commented that he admired the precision developed in Goodin's paper but remained skeptical of its real world relevance: "even if all [of the paper's analysis] is right, it leaves too much out of the epistemic picture."  As examples, Rehfeld cited the problems of partisanship and opinion leaders, which seem inadequately considered in the Condorcet model. 

Rehfeld also suggested that Goodin's argument would be strengthened by broadening the paper's account of the Federalist conjecture.  In addition to selection and deliberative effects, James Madison argued that constituency size was a key factor in ensuring that voters could not effectively communicate with their representatives. Knowing, that they cannot get their representatives enact their selfish wishes, voters would be more likely to choose the representative who would be the best "deliberator and decider for the public good."  Thus, Madison argues that voters would be better at selecting representatives than voting on laws simply because it is the former vote where they chose not on the basis of "what is best for me?" but rather "what is best for all?"  

Group Discussion

Clarissa Hayward of WUSTL Political Theory raised the possibility that in addition to making "correct" decisions, making consistent decisions is also important.  By this logic, representatives may benefit from specialization in that they are in the best position to make decisions that best fit as part of a coherent strategy in a way that voters do not.  Goodin responded that the Condorcet Jury Theorum's definition of correctness would seem to preempt this logic and that he thought that voters were at least as likely to be consistent as representatives.

Ian MacMullen pointed out that even though Goodin's paper finds reason to support representative deliberation, the logic does not imply that representatives should make the final decision.  Rather, the CJT means that representatives should merely make the results of their deliberation public (such as a narrowing the number of alternatives) and then let the masses make the final decision.  Goodin agreed and said he would likely state MacMullen's point explicitly in his next draft.

Conclusion
WPES has been trying to bring in Robert Goodin since its inception, and his presentation certainly met our high expectations.  Goodin's paper was an impressive synthesis of contemporary and traditional political theory, and his presentation made for a very fruitful workshop.  


-Greg Allen

James Bohman on Intergenerational Democracy

 WPES February 12, 2010


Introduction
What do the citizens of a democracy owe their descendants?  That's the central question in James Bohman's paper, "Intergenerational Democracy: Environmental Insecurity as Intergenerational Domination"  Bohman, who spent much of his career defending the benefits of democracy over other systems of government, has now turned his focus to the limitations and drawbacks of democracy.  Last year he presented a paper to WPES which argued that democracies are no better and potentially even worse at addressing the problems of illegal immigration.  This year, he is working on the problems that democracies face over long spans of time, namely, how the mistakes of one generation can restrict the choices and capacities of those that follow.  In this, Bohman was inspired by Edmund Burke, who in discussing the French Revolution, argued that any generation needs to see itself not as the sole master of democratic power and that sovereignty must be shared with future generations.


Bohman thinks that Burke's ideas have a special relevance when considered in light of global warming, since climate change has consequences that are "very bad and very difficult to reverse."  Assuming that the worst predictions of global warming scientists are true, the present, polluting generation "dominates future institutions by disregarding their interests as a future, temporary possessor of power in democratic institutions."


Respondent 
Bohman's respondent was WashU's own Ian MacMullen.  MacMullen broke the paper down into four key themes:

1. Conceptualizing the problem of intergenerational democracy as a challenge to democratic theory.
2. Drawing Connections and analogies between intergenerational domination and other intragenerational forms of domination.
3. Illustrating the theoretical point as it applies to environmental policy.
4. Critiquing various possible solutions to the problem of intergenerational domination.

MacMullen summarized the central claim of the paper is that democracies can enact laws with irreversible harms but that this is undemocratic after taking into account the interests of future generations.  Unfortunately, the most intuitive solutions to the problem seem inadequate.  A constitutional solution, for instance, is always subject to the problem of amending the constitution.  

Because of this, MacMullen commented that the paper seems to imply that an institutional solution seems impossible.  That, however, leads to the problematic conclusion that the interests of future generations are relegated to a minor detail that present deliberators are meant to be conscious of when making policy.  In other words, intergenerational domination might just be "another illustration of the need for deliberative procedures."  MacMullen was left unsure of how deliberative procedures would need to substantively differ in order to properly address the problem.  In his words, "is it just that they're supposed to think differently, or is there actually some concrete institution that will need to be different in order to properly share sovereignty?"  Bohman stated that there were institutional remedies that could be useful, but that none of the ones he has thus far examined divide power sufficiently.

General Discussion

Matt Mancini raised the important point of how the present generation is supposed to know what the needs of future generations will be.  Mancini said that he we would likely be astounded at what 19th century, slave-owning America expected 21st century America to need.  Ironically, the choices that a country makes in order to protect its descendants could very plausibly end up making them worse off.  Bohman conceded that this ignorance was a problem, but said that certain issues, like environmental catastrophe, seemed to be more clear cut that others.

Carl Wellman asked a more fundamental question about whether groups which don't have a clear definition and are unorganized can have unique rights.  In other words, since future generations do not have a defined boundary (as they do not yet exist) there can be no group rights but only individual rights, which seem to be irrelevant in the case of individuals which do not yet exist.  Bohman argued that the citizens of the future were still a group and a corporate body.

Chad Flanders questioned the paper's framing in terms of nondomination as opposed to merely harm or injustice.  In his view, even if we ruin the planet, that is not a form of control over opportunities so much as a form of harm by limiting them.  Here Bohman simply dissented.

-Greg Allen

Zach Hoskins on "Fair Play, Political Obligation, and Punishment"

WPES: February 5, 2009

Introduction
Unlike last week's presenter, Zach Hoskins' paper didn't result in a free voyage to any exotic locale (though I'm sure he'd be grateful for opportunities you know of).  The paper does, however, represent the first chapter in Hoskins' dissertation, and I suppose one could think of that as the beginning of the end of a very different sort of journey.  If the high-quality, extremely lucid argumentation in this first chapter is indicative of what we can expect from the rest of his project, I have no doubt that Hoskins' story will have a happy ending.

[Click Here For a Copy of Zach Hoskins' Paper]

Argument Summary 
Hoskins' dissertation touches on all the main questions on the legal institution of punishment - why punish, who and how, but this paper tackles the more fundamental question of whether or not a society may be justified in punishing at all.  Hoskins' argues that it can, but he finds fault with prior attempts to do so.  He plants his own account of punishment under the "fair play" category, which attempts to frame the issue as connected to obligations engendered by the benefits of societal cooperation.  Hoskins' summarizes the fair play account as follows: "the fact that each member benefits from the compliance of other members generates an obligation to reciprocate by similarly complying" (3).  
Hoskins' version of fair play, however, is an atypical one in that it includes compliance with the practice of punishment as one of the cooperative practices from which individuals in a society benefit.  In other words, citizens are obliged to comply with punishment (either by refraining from breaking the rules or by accepting the resulting punishment) because they benefit from others' doing so. 


Paper Commentary from Discussant Nate Adams
Nate Adams is one of Hoskins' fellow graduate students in the Washington University Philosophy Department.  After summarizing the paper in far more (and far better) detail than I have here, he offered some penetrating questions to Hoskins' paper.  First, Adams asked why individuals could not reject the benefits of collaborative society and thereby also reject their obligations to contribute and cooperate to it.  Hoskins paper quotes Klosko as stating "because the benefits [of defense] are indispensable, [a person] could not say he does not want them" (26), but Adams disagreed that such overwhelming utility foreclosed the possibility of rejection.  Even if such a course would be unwise, it is not incoherent and therefore remains an available option.  As such, they are not obligated to cooperate.  Adams went even further to suggest that Klosko's argument ultimately collapses to a consequentialist one.  


Adams also pressed Hoskins to expand upon one of the potential objections that the paper addressed.  Since Hoskins' account of punishment derives from society, it doesn't provide any explanation for whether or not punishment would be permissible in the state of nature or in any situation outside of a well developed society.  Hoskins conceded that his intuitions on the state of nature are foggy but suggested that punishment may be justifiable in wholly different ways in non-societal cases.


I thought Adams' strongest criticism dealt with Hoskins' formulation of compliance with punishment: a citizen might agree that punishment generally is necessary for the functioning of society, but the individual might also think that the punishment for some particular crime (say, jaywalking) is far out of proportion and therefore does not actually entail a moral obligation to comply.  


General Discussion
Jeff Brown astutely pointed out that Hoskins' paper could be interpreted as going against the democratic tradition since it seemed to indicate that even a religious despot could give rise to moral obligations to comply with laws and punishments.  Somewhat surprisingly, Hoskins' agreed, stating that the obligations to accept punishment result from the existence of benefits of societal compliance with the law - not from the procedures by which the laws were made.  This could theoretically exclude antidemocratic or tyrannical laws, but that depends on empirical and not theoretical questions.


Julia Driver followed up on Brown's point by pressing Hoskins' on cases where individuals do not necessarily benefit from the law.  She provided the example of Columbian drug lords, who are the explicit enemies of the Columbian government and could much more easily engage in their trade in its absence.  Driver asked, since they do not benefit from the law, doesn't Hoskins' account say they are under no obligation to accept punishment for violating it?  Hoskins agreed that the conceptual possibility of individuals who are on balance worse off from the law would be problematic, but he was skeptical of the possiblity of such a case in real life.


Adrienne Davis was receptive to Hoskins' fair play account and suggested that it also offered a prescription for excuses and exceptions to punishment.  In her view, if a person violates a law due to circumstances that would lead any reasonable person to also violate the law, then Hoskins' account does not require their being punished.  Jeff Brown, however, interjected to say that this explanation raised the specter of consequentialism.  


Conclusion
Zach Hoskins is one of the most consistent and active participants in the political theory workshop, and his contributions are always very worthwhile.  I don't think I'm alone in thinking that this paper is a special accomplishment.  Looking over it again before writing this post, I was struck by how Hoskins is able to maintain crystal clear writing and yet still densely pack substantive contributions into every paragraph.  If you didn't already read the paper before, I hope you'll take the opportunity to do so now.  Truly, he doesn't waste a single sentence, and we all wish him the best as he finishes his dissertation.


-Greg

Carl Wellman on Religious Human Rights

WPES: January 29, 2010

Introduction
Professor Carl Wellman is an institution unto himself in the Washington University Philosophy Department and a longtime member of the workshop community, so it was a true pleasure to have him present a paper at last Friday's workshop.  Wellman originally presented the paper at an international conference at Mofid University in Qom, Iran, a city well known as one of the leading intellectual centers of the Middle East.  Both the leading conservative and leading liberal Imams in Iran are schooled there.  Wellman that one of the most notable details of his trip was discovering that the Muslim participants in the conference are typically well versed in western political theory (e.g. Rawls).  By contrast, westerners typically had no familiarity whatsoever with work by the Muslim political theorists and philosophers.  Hopefully that disparity will be lessened as international conferences like the one in Qom become more popular.


Discussant Summary and Commentary 
The respondent for Wellman's paper was Professor Gregory Magarian of WUSTL Law.  He broke the paper down into three central component: 
(1) providing moral justifications for the core rights and attendant implications of religious liberty as outlined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (e.g. Mill's experiments in living argument), 
(2) discussing problematic limitations of the religious component International Covenant (e.g. religious incitements to violence), 
(3) describing the causal relationship between religious rights and peace.


The International covenant enshrines two components to religious rights - the right to freely adopt a religion and the right to outwardly manifest religious traditions and practices.  Magarian summarized the paper as mostly concerned with the manifestation of religion, but this is justified since manifestation has the most notable social effects and moral consequences.  


Magarian's comments on the paper reflected his legal background in providential ways.  For instance, he brought up the attendant risks resulting from the way that the International Covenant eschews the separation of church and state in favor of having the state protect the church.  He also noted that the Covenant included "morality" on the Covenant's list of "important countervailing interests" that could justify restricting religious liberty.  Magarian pointed out that many cultures imply deep ties between the concepts of religion and morality.  This seems to leave open the chance for states to mask persecution of religious minorities because the minority's religious practices conflict with the majority religion's moral doctrines.  Magarian also encouraged Wellman to acknowledge that paper's arguments about the connection between religious rights and peace ultimately require an empirical evaluation.


General Discussion
Chad Flanders of SLU law opened the general discussion by questioning whether or not the religious protections in the International Covenant were necessary at all.  In his thinking, the document already enshrines protections for "association and conscience" which would seem to imply religious protection.  Professor Wellman conceded that Flanders' interpretation was a plausible one, but Wellman argued that there were strong pragmatic and historical reasons to give religion special consideration.  WPES director Frank Lovett followed up on Flanders' point by offering the counterexample of conscientious objectors to military conscription.  Since secular humanists are not allowed to avoid the draft, Lovett argued that such practices imply there is something distinct about religion beyond mere pragmatic concerns.  Professor Wellman agreed the case was problematic but said that the actual problem was that the reasons why religion should be considered a special case was "overdetermined" but that it is difficult for courts to choose one of these explanations in practice.

Building upon a question from Ian MacMullen - who asked about the relationship between religious tolerance and the promotion of peace - I asked professor Wellman about whether his account was only that religious intolerance caused conflict or whether he also believed that religious tolerance promote peace.  Wellman conceded that he hadn't considered the point and that it was worth looking into further, but lightheartedly stated that he "wouldn't bet on it."

Zach Hoskins raised the interesting point of why Wellman's paper made a distinction between the freedom to adopt a religion and the freedom to change religions since the former seems to imply the latter.  Wellman responded that many cultures do not actually equate these two.  He provided the example of Muslim cultures which often are willing to protect the right to adopt a religion, but still ban the possibility renouncing Islam.


Conclusion
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is a legal document that assumes preexisting human rights.  Professor Wellman's paper goes a long way to elucidating the justifications and implications of those rights both as they actually are and as they exist in the covenant.  We look forward to seeing the paper in its final form in his forthcoming book.


-Greg Allen