Friday, November 20, 2009

David Speetzen: Democratic Cosmopolitanism and Forcible Democratization

Introduction
Broadly speaking, there are two different ways of undertaking the task of rigorous political theory.  The first method begins with a philosophical conclusion in mind and then goes about exploring the warrants for such a conclusion.  The alternative method starts with a number of first principles and then traces the logical consequences of their interaction in order to reach a conclusion.  Political theorists utilizing the second technique will sometimes find themselves arguing positions very different from what they had initially expected to conclude.
  
David Speetzen's doctoral dissertation is an example of such an unexpected outcome. His dissertation with WUSTL philosophy was originally a rather mainstream Cosmopolitan evaluation of military intervention but has since undergone a 180 degree turn, with highly unexpected outcomes.  At the workshop last year, Speetzen presented a paper arguing that occupied Iraq should have been given representation in the U.S. Congress.  Though the paper persuaded few, his presentation forcefully and enjoyably challenged some broadly held assumptions of the WPES community.


Speetzen's most recent WPES paper, presented on November 20th, was similarly enlightening. It outlines criteria by which a country could justly convert another country to democracy by force.


Brandon Nelson's Summary and Response
Speetzen's discussant was Brandon Nelson, a graduate student in WUSTL Political Theory.  Nelson began by summarizing Speetzen's paper, which goes against the "traditional" view of when intervention is called for (rarely).   Speetzen derives this conclusion from the premise that democracy is instrumental to the protection and promotion of human rights and representative government.  As such, countries with the ability to promote democracy ought to do so, and when no preferable alternatives exist, this effort can rightly include use of military force.  


To explain his argument, Speetzen draws a helpful analogy between parenting and governing.  Generally, parents and governments should be accorded a large measure of independence, but in cases where they carry out their duties in an illegitimate manner, third parties have a moral obligation to intervene.  Speetzen holds that there is a further similarity in that the standards for what constitutes acceptable parenting or governing have risen along with the capacity of relevant actors to ensure better lives for children and citizens.  


In other words, the standards for what constitutes a "legitimate" government may change over time based on the social and economic capacity of a country to protect human rights and ensure adequate representation for its population.  The fact that these standards can shift complicates Speetzen's analysis tremendously, but it does seem to account for the intuition that not providing one's child an education is more morally acceptable in a society of starvation than in one of abundance.


After summarizing, Nelson raised a number of pointed arguments that challenged the fundamentals of Speetzen's thesis.  I'll mention two here: first, Nelson thought that the empirical literature which Speetzen had cited as evidence that democracies more effectively promote and protect human rights is virtually entirely based on states which became democracies of their own free will.  Since the human rights record of forced democracies is much more unknown, Nelson thinks Speetzen cannot rightly claim this empirical backing.


Second, Nelson brought up the hypothetical case of an authoritarian country which had a strong history of protecting human rights and is moreover popular among its people.  Speetzen acknowledged that this was potentially the strongest objection to his paper and said that this was conceivably a case where a country was legitimate though non-democratic; however, Speetzen thought that this may simply be a case where democracy was morally permissible but not justified.


The WPES Open Discussion
Marilyn Friedman of WUSTL philosophy opened the general discussion by raising the specter of imperialism - that the rationale of democratization could be used by the intervening country as cover for the pursuit of its own interest.  Friedman suggested that Speetzen consider including in his full dissertation a discussion of cosmopolitan safeguards to protect against such abuse.


Andrew Rehfeld of WUSTL political theory characterized the paper as NeoLockean since Locke argued that people have the right of revolution with a justification that resembled Speetzen's justification for intervention.  Rehfeld, however, also stated that Locke's right of revolution came with two caveats: (1) there must be a long train of abuses, and (2) the revolutionaries must have enough force to succeed.  Rehfeld thought that Speetzen's paper could benefit from a modified formulation of Locke's second precaution.  Speetzen agreed and is considering including this in his discussion where he states that the moral fact of whether a party should intervene is connected to the ability to accomplish goals.


Conclusion
Speetzen's paper is yet another example of his willingness to give to chase down the conclusions no matter where they lead.  While I can't say that I agree with all of his arguments, I don't think I'm alone in saying that examining the points of contention has given me a much richer and fuller understanding of my own views.  This is, of course, a hallmark of a worthy contribution to political theory, and I wish David the best of luck with the rest of his dissertation.


-Greg Allen

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