David Speetzen: Democratic Cosmopolitanism and Forcible Democratization

Introduction
Broadly speaking, there are two different ways of undertaking the task of rigorous political theory.  The first method begins with a philosophical conclusion in mind and then goes about exploring the warrants for such a conclusion.  The alternative method starts with a number of first principles and then traces the logical consequences of their interaction in order to reach a conclusion.  Political theorists utilizing the second technique will sometimes find themselves arguing positions very different from what they had initially expected to conclude.
  
David Speetzen's doctoral dissertation is an example of such an unexpected outcome. His dissertation with WUSTL philosophy was originally a rather mainstream Cosmopolitan evaluation of military intervention but has since undergone a 180 degree turn, with highly unexpected outcomes.  At the workshop last year, Speetzen presented a paper arguing that occupied Iraq should have been given representation in the U.S. Congress.  Though the paper persuaded few, his presentation forcefully and enjoyably challenged some broadly held assumptions of the WPES community.


Speetzen's most recent WPES paper, presented on November 20th, was similarly enlightening. It outlines criteria by which a country could justly convert another country to democracy by force.


Brandon Nelson's Summary and Response
Speetzen's discussant was Brandon Nelson, a graduate student in WUSTL Political Theory.  Nelson began by summarizing Speetzen's paper, which goes against the "traditional" view of when intervention is called for (rarely).   Speetzen derives this conclusion from the premise that democracy is instrumental to the protection and promotion of human rights and representative government.  As such, countries with the ability to promote democracy ought to do so, and when no preferable alternatives exist, this effort can rightly include use of military force.  


To explain his argument, Speetzen draws a helpful analogy between parenting and governing.  Generally, parents and governments should be accorded a large measure of independence, but in cases where they carry out their duties in an illegitimate manner, third parties have a moral obligation to intervene.  Speetzen holds that there is a further similarity in that the standards for what constitutes acceptable parenting or governing have risen along with the capacity of relevant actors to ensure better lives for children and citizens.  


In other words, the standards for what constitutes a "legitimate" government may change over time based on the social and economic capacity of a country to protect human rights and ensure adequate representation for its population.  The fact that these standards can shift complicates Speetzen's analysis tremendously, but it does seem to account for the intuition that not providing one's child an education is more morally acceptable in a society of starvation than in one of abundance.


After summarizing, Nelson raised a number of pointed arguments that challenged the fundamentals of Speetzen's thesis.  I'll mention two here: first, Nelson thought that the empirical literature which Speetzen had cited as evidence that democracies more effectively promote and protect human rights is virtually entirely based on states which became democracies of their own free will.  Since the human rights record of forced democracies is much more unknown, Nelson thinks Speetzen cannot rightly claim this empirical backing.


Second, Nelson brought up the hypothetical case of an authoritarian country which had a strong history of protecting human rights and is moreover popular among its people.  Speetzen acknowledged that this was potentially the strongest objection to his paper and said that this was conceivably a case where a country was legitimate though non-democratic; however, Speetzen thought that this may simply be a case where democracy was morally permissible but not justified.


The WPES Open Discussion
Marilyn Friedman of WUSTL philosophy opened the general discussion by raising the specter of imperialism - that the rationale of democratization could be used by the intervening country as cover for the pursuit of its own interest.  Friedman suggested that Speetzen consider including in his full dissertation a discussion of cosmopolitan safeguards to protect against such abuse.


Andrew Rehfeld of WUSTL political theory characterized the paper as NeoLockean since Locke argued that people have the right of revolution with a justification that resembled Speetzen's justification for intervention.  Rehfeld, however, also stated that Locke's right of revolution came with two caveats: (1) there must be a long train of abuses, and (2) the revolutionaries must have enough force to succeed.  Rehfeld thought that Speetzen's paper could benefit from a modified formulation of Locke's second precaution.  Speetzen agreed and is considering including this in his discussion where he states that the moral fact of whether a party should intervene is connected to the ability to accomplish goals.


Conclusion
Speetzen's paper is yet another example of his willingness to give to chase down the conclusions no matter where they lead.  While I can't say that I agree with all of his arguments, I don't think I'm alone in saying that examining the points of contention has given me a much richer and fuller understanding of my own views.  This is, of course, a hallmark of a worthy contribution to political theory, and I wish David the best of luck with the rest of his dissertation.


-Greg Allen

Anne Newman: Charter School Lotteries

This Friday Anne Newman of WUSTL Education presented a paper entitled, "Luck of the Draw?  On the Fairness of Charter School Admissions Policies."  The paper is a joint project between Newman and Jonathan Dolle of Stanford University.  (Unfortunately Dolle was unable to make it out to Saint Louis for the workshop.)  

Unlike most of the papers presented at WPES, Newman and Dolle's work is aimed at the policy-making community, rather than the academic one.  In other words, their recommendations on how to reform charter school lotteries are ultimately going to be presented to individuals and committees with the power to implement those recommendations, which is quite an exciting prospect.  We wish Newman and Dolle the best of luck in their persuasive efforts.

Newman began her presentation by pointing out that there is a gap between the rhetoric supporting charter schools and the reality of their implementation, and "the integrity of findings about charter schools' [generally positive] outcomes is contingent upon the integrity of their admissions processes."  Though most charter schools utilize a form of lottery system so that the opportunity for attendance is randomized, Newman argues that many of these lotteries are often operated in ways that may compromise these lotteries' seeming fairness.  

Our discussant today was Zach Hoskins of WUSTL Philosophy.  He began by summarizing Newman's argument:

the only way to know that a charter school lottery had a fair outcome is to know that it used a fair process.  Unfortunately, such lotteries are difficult to conduct in ways that are publicly fair and transparent.  For instance, though "federal law explicitly prohibits charters from incorporating certain types of preferences into their lotteries, charters can easily influence the pool of students seeking admission (and therefore the final student body) through targeted marketing practices outside the lottery admission process."

Thus, Newman argues that such lotteries need to meet three standards of fairness in order to be truly impartial in their allocation of a vital but scarce good:

1.  Procedural fairness - does the procedure used treat like cases alike?

2.  Substantive fairness - is the procedure used a fair procedure?

3.  Public fairness - is the procedure understood and accountable publicly?

To meet all these standards, Newman recommends that charter schools make three main changes to the admissions process:

1.  "Establish clearer laws on allowable preferences" since some deviations from the lottery are acceptable (e.g. sibling preferences) while others may be a mask for discrimination.

2.  "Establish clearer laws about what constitutes a 'public lottery'" to make sure that lotteries are public and accessible to participants.

3.  "Require that lotteries be conducted by independent third-parties" to prevent conflicts of interest by those conducting the lottery.

4.  "Require annual admission audits" to increase accountability.

Hoskins generally thought the paper was reasonable and compelling.  Moreover, he thought the policy recommendations presented were all quite apt ways to better the charter admissions process.  Thus, his comments focused on the philosophical underpinnings of the paper's recommendations.  Specifically, Hoskins focused on the conceptual distinction between fairness and justice.  Such a distinction is useful in clarifying, for instance, why it may be just (though unfair) to allow sibling preferences in charter school admissions.  Hoskins worried that some parts of the paper "risk diluting the notion of fairness such that it is essentially synonymous with the word bad," and he saw the distinction between justice and fairness as a way to preempt this problem.

This was most applicable on the Newman's standard of public fairness.  Hoskins argues that transparency is good, but that it isn't good for reasons of fairness: "A policy that is equally opaque to everyone doesn't seem to treat anyone unfairly" though it does treat everyone badly.

The general discussion at this workshop was a bit different than usual.  The crowd was a tad smaller, and this allowed for a measure of cross talk that was productive in a way that isn't very easy to capture in my writing here.  

Ian MacMullen of WUSTL Political Theory opened the discussion by building upon Hoskins' argument: MacMullen questioned whether publicity and transparency are merely items with instrumental value towards achieving goals of procedural and substantive fairness.  He also, said, however, that if publicity does have some value, that one of the most persuasive ways of demonstrating this might be a case where publicity conflicts with other important values and is still desirable.  

Here Newman defended her characterization of public fairness by saying that such transparency is required in order to not just actually have a fair procedure but also to treat fellow citizens as civic equals in their right to know and check that the procedure was fair.  She agreed that the conflictual example would be helpful and plans to include it in the next draft.


-Greg

Andrew Rehfeld: Representation and Democracy

WPES: October 30, 2009

Hello Political Theory Community.  Before I begin writing on Andrew Rehfeld's paper, there are a few housekeeping matters to take care of regarding this blog:

First, if you wrote a comment on the last post regarding Professor Rubenstein's paper on Oxfam and representation, Professor Rubenstein has taken the time to post lengthy and worthwhile responses to all of your questions and arguments.  I hope you'll all get a chance to take a look at what she wrote.

Second, I apologize for those of you who wanted to comment on Rehfeld's paper but were unable to do so on account of the lag in posting this response.  In the future, I'll write up a short teaser post that will be up the day of the workshop, so you can comment immediately following the session, before I've gotten a chance to write my summary of the workshop discussion.

Finally, we've got a lot of high quality photographs this week thanks to a good friend of mine, Jake Laperruque, donating his time and camera.  Click any of the images in this post to see a much larger and higher resolution photo.

With that, let's move to the workshop of Professor Rehfeld's paper.

Professor Andrew Rehfeld

This past Friday, October 30, WPES had the special pleasure of welcoming back the workshop's founder, Andrew Rehfeld, to the head of the table.  Rehfeld presented a paper that will eventually be the introductory chapter in his forthcoming book on Representation in Politics.  The book expands upon Rehfeld's recently published article in the American Political Science Review.

From left to right: WPES director Frank Lovett, presenter 
Andrew Rehfeld, respondent Chad Flanders

The paper Rehfeld introduced this past Friday outlines the core features of his theory on representation.  It's worth noting that while the examples he is interested in are generally political ones, his argument's scope is not limited to the political sphere.

Rehfeld's formal, quadratic definition of representation is as follows:

1) some entity, X, who/that

stands in for

2) some other entity, Y

in order to

3) perform a particular Function/Activity, F

corresponding in some way to

4) some feature of Y

The first thing to notice is that Rehfeld makes no attempt to confine the concept of representation within any normative dimension.  This stands in stark contradiction of virtually all of the writing on political representation.  What Rehfeld terms the "standard account" (best shown in Pitkin, 1967) would argue that a congressman who rigged his election could not possibly represent his home district because political representation only occurs in cases where democratic norms are upheld.  Thus, even if Congress officially accepts this corrupt individual as the representative for that constituency, in truth he is not.

Rehfeld counters this account by positing that "representation is an instrumental good; one does not have representation for its own sake."  In other words, the central failing of the standard account is that it conflates normative and positive representation such that it order to represent at all, one has to represent justly.  Rehfeld's contribution, therefore, is that his account separates what it means to represent from what it means to represent well.  A corrupt Congressman may have rigged the election that led to his being recognized as the representative of his district , but this injustice does not change the fact that, for the purpose of national legislating and with the audience of the federal government, he is that district's representative.  His corruption makes him a bad representative.  It is only his impeachment or death that could make him a non-representative.

Friday's discussant was professor Chad Flanders of Saint Louis University's School of Law.  

Chad Flanders

Flanders and Rehfeld actually have an interesting history together.  The two both spent the first half of this decade at the University of Chicago and even took a class together in which they studied Rawls.  Not surprisingly, then, Flanders had a lot of nice things to say about Rehfeld's paper (and rightly so!)

 

Old friends

Flanders' main critique of the paper was that Rehfeld's quadratic equation lacks the crucial stipulation of the role of the audience.  Though Rehfeld repeatedly states in the paper that audience recognition is essential for representation, the analytic structure of the quadratic equation leaves this out.  Rehfeld responded that who the relevant audience is and how they go about recognizing a representative is subsumed within the function category, F. 

For example, when dealing with the purpose of making national legislation, the relevant audience is Congress, and the process of their recognition is explicitly laid out in the same rules that guide legislating.  This may indeed be a sufficient response, but I'm still left agreeing with Flanders that the role of the audience was a point of confusion (in an otherwise astoundingly clear paper).

Professor Flanders provided an excellent summary 

and response of Professor Rehfeld's paper.

Flanders also took issue with the role of correspondence between the representative and the represented in Rehfeld's account.  Rehfeld's paper states that "there is always some sense of correspondence, minimally arising from the standing in relationship of the two entities."  Flanders found this quote problematic: if in some cases correspondence is merely this relationship, "doesn't it follows that [in a minimalist account of representation] correspondence is a superfluous notion?"  Rehfeld agreed he needed to reconsider the issue.

 Workshop attendees have a variety of different

academic backgrounds and perspectives

The general discussion of Rehfeld's paper was particularly lively.  Right off the bat, Professor Gerald Izenberg of WUSTL History challenged the core argument of Rehfeld's paper, that representation implies a positive dimension apart from its normative one.  Izenberg argued that legitimacy in appointing a representative is built into the representative relationship such that normativity is a necessary part of the account.  Rehfeld deftly responded that "legitimacy" was subject to the exact same criticism as representation in that it has a sociological dimension (who do we think has the power to select a representative?) and a normative dimension (who do we think ought to have the power to select a representative?)

Professor Randall Calvert of WUSTL Political Science offered Rehfeld some helpful advice for structuring the presentation of the argument.  Since Rehfeld's account of representation applies to politics but is not limited to it, Calvert suggested that Rehfeld consider opening the paper by describing a series of questionable instances of representation and thereafter demonstrating how the new account both clarifies and resolves the confusion.  

Piggy-backing off Calvert's comments, Anne Newman of WUSTL Education suggested that Rehfeld distinguish that his paper presents a general theory of representation (which applies to art and literature just as easily as politics).  As such, Newman recommended that Rehfeld change his topic name from "political representation," which does seem to hint at arguments and issues closer to those of Pitkin, to "representation in politics," which better expresses that Rehfeld's theory is a general one applied to a particular topic.  Rehfeld enthusiastically agreed.

Congratulations all around for another productive workshop

  All in all, it was an enjoyable and interesting discussion from one of the luminaries of the WPES community.  If you'd like to continue the conversation, please use the comments section below.

-Greg Allen