Professor Jennifer Rubenstein of the University of Virginia was our guest presenter on Friday. Rubenstein’s paper, entitled “The Ethics of INGO Advocacy or Why It is OK that No One Elected Oxfam,” was as much of a treat as the title suggests. The work is destined to be a chapter in Rubenstein’s forthcoming book on the political theory of International Nongovernmental Organizations.
Rubenstein’s interest in INGO advocacy stems from the intriguing theoretical characteristics of the situation in which they operate. As primarily Western institutions acting outside the West, they justify their actions by appealing to universal global values. This was a more straightforward defense when INGOs were interested primarily in procuring aid, but over a decade ago many groups became convinced that meaningful and lasting solutions to international crises would require not just aid but large-scale policy changes. When Western governments and international institutions included INGOs like Oxfam in international policy-making discussions, The Economist raised the important question of “Who Elected Oxfam?”
In her complex and rigorous paper, Rubenstein concludes that, while Oxfam does engage in varying degrees of representation of those populations they seek to help, they should ultimately not be held to the same standards as a democratically elected government. Rather than be evaluated by the standards of representation, Rubenstein argues that INGOs should be held to the standards of a theory of justice.
The respondent for Rubenstein’s paper was Professor Kit Wellman of WUSTL Philosophy. Wellman opened his remarks by complimenting Rubenstein’s paper as a skillful example of why contemporary Political Theory is such a lively field: though traditional debates about solutions to large scale problems were debates between statists; now there are a number of plausible alternatives to state action, such as non-governmental organizations like Oxfam or inter-governmental or organizations like the United Nations. I’m inclined to agree with Wellman on his point and his compliment.
After summarizing Rubenstein's paper (from memory, impressively), Wellman’s primary contention in his discussion was that Rubenstein’s paper was overly charitable to the arguments of those who disagree with her. For him, the fact that INGOs do not violate human rights, do not coerce, and do not violate state sovereignty make the question of whether or not their actions are morally permissible an open and shut case. Oxfam should no more be held to the standards of representation than The Economist should. As he puts it, “to the extent that these groups are included in the policymaking process, it is due to the strength of the content of their claims.”
In the ensuing general discussion, which was particularly engaging at this workshop, Professor Julia Driver of WUSTL Philosophy extended Wellman’s argument in stronger terms. “Doesn’t morality entail it’s own authority?" she asked.
Carl Wellman, (Kit Wellman’s father, also of WUSTL Philosophy) raised a fantastic question about Rubenstein’s definition of representation. Using an astute comparison to end-of-life medical decision-making, Wellman pushed Rubenstein on why she defines representation according to what the represented individuals think is in their best interest, as opposed to what their best interests actually are. Rubenstein pushed right back by saying that the medical analogy doesn't quite fit since the affected individuals are not unconscious and are generally in a good position to understand their interests.
WPES Director Frank Lovett questioned why Rubenstein thought that the factors she raised which justified exempting INGOs from standards of representation—that they are “second best” actors operating in a non-ideal context—could not be included as subsets in a theory of representation. In other words, why jump over to a theory of justice instead of create a category of representation for various sub-ideal contexts? Rubenstein answered by referring to the allocation problem. Given that INGOs have scare resources, they must choose whom to help, and that is a question better answered by a theory of justice than one of representation.
Thanks and congratulations to Professor Rubenstein on a great paper and a great presentation. If you'd like to continue the conversation, please use the comments below.
Yes, I thought that if the worry had to do with Oxfam, or some other organization, lacking authority to participate in policy formation, that worry could be met by noting that moral concerns carry their own authority. The actual citizens who are affected by the policies are usually vulnerable, and realistically not in a position to press for morally justified reforms -- so the non-profits can serve that function.
ReplyDeleteI also thought that the 'second best' approach could have been spelled out in terms of what the relevant alternatives were taken to be -- that would have helped with Andrew's question. Non-profits are 'second best' relative to full participation in policy formation on the part of citizens. They may be 103rd best relative to what is really, genuinely, ideal.
J Driver
I'm sympathetic to the basic claim of Rubenstein's paper, namely, that INGOs should be evaluated according to how effectively they promote justice (and democracy?) rather than merely asking how effectively they represent the particular constituency of disadvantaged persons with which they have chosen to work. The two evaluative standards certainly can conflict: representing some particular group of disadvantaged persons may not be the best way to promote justice (especially when other disadvantaged groups are represented inadequately or not at all).
ReplyDeleteBut, as my questions on Friday indicated, I suspect that many INGOs are in fact situated such that the best way that they can promote justice, given their scarce resources, is to represent (both the wishes and the interests?) of the constituency with which they have been working closely for many years. They are (to some degree) specialists: they lack the information and expertise that would be necessary to figure out and advocate for what justice requires. That doesn't mean that an INGO should entirely ignore the possible negative repercussions of its work for other disadvantaged groups, especially those that lack representation where they sorely need it -- I don't think any morally defensible account of representation will say that representatives should just stick up for their constituency no matter the costs to others. But there may well be a sensible division of labor here, and INGOs should not be criticized for performing the role for which they are best equipped.
Finally, note that Rubenstein does not (yet) claim that INGOs have a moral duty to operate in a way that is optimal in terms of promoting justice. So, even if justice would be better served by an INGO's switching focus (perhaps by diverting resources from working with and learning about the needs of their traditional constituency to understanding and advocating for a needier group OR grasping the big picture of global justice), it may not be required to do so. Just like the ordinary people who donate to them, NGOs are not morally obliged to do the most good in the world: they need not behave fully impartially, and they are not responsible for the scarcity of adequate representatives for the many disadvantaged groups in the world.
- Ian MacMullen
Following up a bit on both of the above comments, and picking up on Carl Wellman's question at the talk, I wonder if Rubenstein could say more about the relationship of representation and justice. Are justice and representation really opposed (as at least the set-up of Rubenstein's paper seems to imply)? Or are they only opposed in certain, non-ideal circumstances?
ReplyDelete--Chad Flanders
Thanks again very much for your extremely helpful responses to my paper-- in the workshop, in conversations during my visit to Wash U, and on this blog. Below are some responses to some of the comments on the blog (which I think is a great idea!).
ReplyDeleteRe: Carl Wellman’s very good question about representing interests versus preferences:
I didn’t have a good response to this at the time, but what I want to say now is this: with regard to the main point of my paper, the preferences/interests distinction doesn’t matter: the allocation problem and the displacement problem are still problems, regardless of whether one thinks of representation as the representation of preferences or the representation of interests. Where this distinction does matter is with regard to not mis-representing as a minimum side constraint: when I say that, in the course of repesenting and making arguments about justice, INGOs should not misrepresent, do I mean that they should not misrepresent people’s interests or preferences? Here, I would have to say (though, again, I didn’t say this in the paper): both. INGOs should not misrepresent people’s interests or their preferences. In cases where people’s preferences conflict what an INGO sincerely takes to be in their interest, and when this disagreement cannot be worked out through discussion, then the INGO should choose to not represent that group. (I doubt this kind of thing happens very often, but when it does, I don’t see another way around the problem.)
Julia Driver writes:
ReplyDeleteI thought that if the worry had to do with Oxfam, or some other organization, lacking authority to participate in policy formation, that worry could be met by noting that moral concerns carry their own authority. The actual citizens who are affected by the policies are usually vulnerable, and realistically not in a position to press for morally justified reforms -- so the non-profits can serve that function.
This is a very interesting comment. I worry, however, about the idea that moral concerns carry their own authority, because—if I understand this idea correctly— it suggests that INGOs are well-situated to know both what constitutes a moral concern and how to address it. But who is to say that INGOs are right in either case? This is why I think that we always have to regret it when Agent A makes decisions that affect group B’s fundamental interests, but Agent A isn’t in some way accountable to group B. (It might be unavoidable, but it’s regrettable.) On this view, the source of Oxfam’s authority is the substance of its arguments, which must make references to people’s wishes/interests and how to fairly adjudicate among these. Oxfam’s moral authority doesn’t come from the fact that it has moral concerns (or, so I would argue…).
Driver is absolutely right, I think, that I need to say more about the idea of second-best. What I want to say (though this isn’t spelled out in the paper) is that a) INGOs are “second-best” in the sense of being not first best; I don’t mean that they are second-best as compared to third-best or fourth-best. Maybe they are 103rd best. But I also don’t want to get bogged down in articulating and defending one account of what is first-best. I want to say that NGOs are second-best (in the sense of being not ideal) on several different accounts of what is first-best. My goal is to find a way to talk about the ethics of the second-best that doesn’t rest on a single account of what is first-best.
[Sorry for all of the posts; the website wouldn't let me do just one long one...]
ReplyDeleteMacMullen writes:
I don't think any morally defensible account of representation will say that representatives should just stick up for their constituency no matter the costs to others. But there may well be a sensible division of labor here…
I completely agree with this. But it’s important to distinguish between the act of representing and how it is justified. I agree that INGOs should sometimes represent, so long as the justification for them doing so is articulated in the language of justice (with, perhaps, reference to more pragmatic issues of division of labor and efficiency). This adds an interesting twist to the argument in the paper. I argue that holding INGOs to justice-based standards promotes democratic norms more than holding them to representation-based standards. MacMullen says that for pragmatic reasons, representing a particular group might turn out to be the best way for an INGO to promote justice overall. So what we have is INGOs engaging in representation, which they defend on the grounds that doing so will promote justice. This, in turn, promotes democratic norms of inclusion (by avoiding the allocation problem) and self-determination (by avoiding the displacement problem). Complicated? Yes. Plausible? I think/hope so!
Flanders says:
Are justice and representation really opposed (as at least the set-up of Rubenstein's paper seems to imply)? Or are they only opposed in certain, non-ideal circumstances?
The latter! Democracy is a central component of most ideal liberal theories of justice (e.g. equally extensive political liberties in Rawls’ TOJ). Where justice and democracy come into conflict is in situations where one party (say, INGOs) makes justice-based claims—e.g. “We think that justice demands X!” outside of a democratic context. In such cases, the appeal isn’t usually to democratic procedure within ideal theory, it is to other values (e.g. human rights).