Jennifer Rubenstein: "Why It Is OK that No One Elected Oxfam"

Professor Jennifer Rubenstein of the University of Virginia was our guest presenter on Friday.  Rubenstein’s paper, entitled “The Ethics of INGO Advocacy or Why It is OK that No One Elected Oxfam,” was as much of a treat as the title suggests.  The work is destined to be a chapter in Rubenstein’s forthcoming book on the political theory of International Nongovernmental Organizations.

Rubenstein’s interest in INGO advocacy stems from the intriguing theoretical characteristics of the situation in which they operate.  As primarily Western institutions acting outside the West, they justify their actions by appealing to universal global values.  This was a more straightforward defense when INGOs were interested primarily in procuring aid, but over a decade ago many groups became convinced that meaningful and lasting solutions to international crises would require not just aid but large-scale policy changes.  When Western governments and international institutions included INGOs like Oxfam in international policy-making discussions, The Economist raised the important question of “Who Elected Oxfam?”

In her complex and rigorous paper, Rubenstein concludes that, while Oxfam does engage in varying degrees of representation of those populations they seek to help, they should ultimately not be held to the same standards as a democratically elected government.  Rather than be evaluated by the standards of representation, Rubenstein argues that INGOs should be held to the standards of a theory of justice.

The respondent for Rubenstein’s paper was Professor Kit Wellman of WUSTL Philosophy.  Wellman opened his remarks by complimenting Rubenstein’s paper as a skillful example of why contemporary Political Theory is such a lively field: though traditional debates about solutions to large scale problems were debates between statists; now there are a number of plausible alternatives to state action, such as non-governmental organizations like Oxfam or inter-governmental or organizations like the United Nations.  I’m inclined to agree with Wellman on his point and his compliment.

After summarizing Rubenstein's paper (from memory, impressively), Wellman’s primary contention in his discussion was that Rubenstein’s paper was overly charitable to the arguments of those who disagree with her.  For him, the fact that INGOs do not violate human rights, do not coerce, and do not violate state sovereignty make the question of whether or not their actions are morally permissible an open and shut case.  Oxfam should no more be held to the standards of representation than The Economist should.  As he puts it, “to the extent that these groups are included in the policymaking process, it is due to the strength of the content of their claims.” 

In the ensuing general discussion, which was particularly engaging at this workshop, Professor Julia Driver of WUSTL Philosophy extended Wellman’s argument in stronger terms.  “Doesn’t morality entail it’s own authority?" she asked.

Carl Wellman, (Kit Wellman’s father, also of WUSTL Philosophy) raised a fantastic question about Rubenstein’s definition of representation.  Using an astute comparison to end-of-life medical decision-making, Wellman pushed Rubenstein on why she defines representation according to what the represented individuals think is in their best interest, as opposed to what their best interests actually are.  Rubenstein pushed right back by saying that the medical analogy doesn't quite fit since the affected individuals are not unconscious and are generally in a good position to understand their interests.

WPES Director Frank Lovett questioned why Rubenstein thought that the factors she raised which justified exempting INGOs from standards of representation—that they are “second best” actors operating in a non-ideal context—could not be included as subsets in a theory of representation.  In other words, why jump over to a theory of justice instead of create a category of representation for various sub-ideal contexts?  Rubenstein answered by referring to the allocation problem.  Given that INGOs have scare resources, they must choose whom to help, and that is a question better answered by a theory of justice than one of representation.

Thanks and congratulations to Professor Rubenstein on a great paper and a great presentation.  If you'd like to continue the conversation, please use the comments below.

Jeff Brown: Disability, Equality, and the Minority Group Model

This past Friday saw the first time WPES had a graduate student present this semester.  Jeff Brown of WUSTL Philosophy wrote a thought-provoking paper on equality and disability.  The paper will eventually be a part of his broader dissertation on disabilities, which is a positive and normative discussion on the “ideal of equality and the fact of disability.”

Brown begins by tracing historical thinking on disability.  The traditional paradigm has been the medical model, wherein individuals have a medical problem, which causes their disability.  The new paradigm, which is broadly favored by social advocates for the disabled, views disability as a consequence of discrimination.  In this model, referred to as the minority group model, it is not the individual's physical need for wheelchairs that causes disability: it is society's lack of ramps.  Disability, in other words, is a social construct.

As a piece of rigorous analytic philosophy, navigation of Brown’s paper requires some introduction of ideas and terminology.  Luckily, the respondent on Friday was none other than WPES director Frank Lovett. (Professor Ian MacMullen of Political Science generously ran the discussion in Dr. Lovett's place).  I’ll try to summarize the paper and necessary background as concisely as Dr. Lovett did on Friday:

To illustrate the failings of both the minority group model and the medical model, Brown contrasts two different versions of an equality ideal: The first is "formal equality of opportunity," which defines equal treatment as when there is no active or intended discrimination based on morally irrelevant characteristics (e.g. ethnicity).  The second is fair equality of opportunity, which holds that equal treatment is satisfied when people with roughly similar abilities are able to achieve roughly similar rewards.

Brown points out that a racist society could quite easily meet the employment requirements of the formal equality model by limiting its discrimination to before the hiring process, e.g. if racial minorities are prevented from receiving an education, they will be objectively unqualified when applying for jobs. 

Brown argues the disabled situation parallels the racial one because their opportunities to gain experience and qualifications are limited due to the material and social conditions of society.  Even in the absence of formal discrimination, serious disadvantages remain.  Thus “appealing to a fair equality of opportunity justifies a reasonable accommodation.”

However, Brown makes two major criticisms of the formal equality of opportunity model.  First, it’s standards for equality are too stringent and may require the provision of material aids to the disabled even beyond “a reasonable accommodation,” and second, the model doesn’t adequately account for those severe disabilities which no amount of societal intervention can fully compensate for.  For instance, there currently seems to be no way to build planes that can be flown by the blind.

The general discussion was a particularly lively one on Friday, evidence no doubt of an interesting topic.  Here are some of the highlights:

Professor Larry May raised the issue of where one draws the line constituting objectively “disabled.”  Could Dr. May, for instance, be considered disabled relative to a pro baseball player if it would take him $100,000 worth of surgery to get his fastball up to speed?  More plausibly, what if his memory just isn’t that good, but he wants to be a lawyer or hold some other profession that demands a strong memory?

Professor Chad Flanders of SLU Law asked an interesting question about the moral implications of the cause of any particular disability: should the person whose legs are disabled from birth be on the same moral standing as someone whose legs are ruined by their own drunk driving?

I myself was curious as to how Brown’s view that equality requires reasonable accommodation might be affected by those “disabled” groups’ views.  For example,  many members of the Deaf community view cochlear hearing implants as immoral and even cultural genocide.  Would reasonable accommodation require making only those changes that accord with the Deaf person’s cultural views?

As always, it was an interesting and engaging workshop.  If you'd like to share your own thoughts on the discussion or Brown's paper, please use the comments section.

-Greg Allen